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THE DISPOSING POWER OF THE LEGISLATURE 
Thomas W. Merrill* 
The Constitution as we understand it includes principles that have 
emerged over time in a common law fashion. One such principle is the dis 
posing power of the legislature?the understanding that only the legislature 
has the power to arrange, order, and distribute the power to act with the force 
of law among the different institutions of society. This Essay illustrates the 
gradual emergence of the disposing power in criminal, civil, and administra 
tive law, and offers some reasons why it is appropriate that the legislature be 
given this exclusive authority. One implication of the disposing power is 
that another type of constitutional common law?the power of courts to pre 
scribe rules inspired by the Constitution but subject to legislative revision, as 
described in Professor Henry Monaghan fs pathbreaking 1975 Harvard Law 
Review Foreword?may in fact be unconstitutional in many of its 
applications. 
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I. Two Types of Constitutional Common Law 
Henry Monaghan is rightly credited with being the first to conceive 
of certain aspects of constitutional law as federal common law.1 What has 
not been observed, to my knowledge, is that Monaghan has identified 
and explicated two distinct types of constitutional common law. Both 
types can fairly be described as common law, in that their content is de 
fined primarily by courts through the process of case-by-case decision 
making. But there are important differences between these two types, 
which for convenience I will call "Type I" and "Type II" constitutional 
common law. 
Type I constitutional common law is the subject of Monaghan's cele 
brated 1975 Harvard Law Review Foreword. It is, to use his words, "a sub 
structure of substantive, procedural, and remedial rules drawing their in 
* Charles Evans Hughes Professor of Law, Columbia Law School. Many thanks to 
Margaret Merrill for her help with research and revision of this Essay. 
1. See Henry P. Monaghan, The Supreme Court 1974 Term?Foreword: 
Constitutional Common Law, 89 Harv. L. Rev. 1, 13-14 (1975) [hereinafter Monaghan, 
Foreword]. 
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spiration and authority from, but not required by, various constitutional 
provisions."2 The key attribute of Type I constitutional common law, in 
addition to its more general quality of being judge-made, is that it is r?vis 
able by ordinary legislation. Most of Monaghan's illustrations of Type I 
constitutional common law were drawn from the field of criminal proce 
dure, with the exclusionary rule and Miranda warnings given special 
prominence.3 He argued that these kinds of doctrinal elaborations need 
not be conceived of as Marbury-style interpretations of the constitutional 
text; rather, they can be regarded as a species of federal common law.4 
As such, Type I constitutional common law, like other forms of federal 
common law, is subject to legislative modification.5 Professor Monaghan 
argued that this reusability is a good thing, at least in the context of re 
medial innovation. Courts will act more boldly in experimenting with 
different remedial or prophylactic rules if they know the legislature can 
correct any missteps they may make. This is especially true given the 
power of the legislature to develop superior remedies for constitutional 
violations relative to those that can be devised by courts.6 
Type II constitutional common law shares with Type I the feature of 
being judge-made, or at least of deriving from evolved practice, rather 
than resting on the interpretation of a canonical constitutional text. In 
contrast to Type I constitutional common law, however, Type II has the 
same status as Marbury-style constitutional review. It is the supreme law of 
the land, binding on all governmental branches?legislative, executive, 
and judicial?at both the state and federal levels. Hence, Type II consti 
tutional common law is not subject to legislative revision. The most 
prominent example of Type II constitutional common law may be the 
practice of judicial review itself. The Constitution contains no provision 
expressly authorizing courts to invalidate laws in the name of the 
Constitution. Marbury justified the power of judicial review in terms of 
certain basic postulates presupposed by the Constitution, such as the 
higher law nature of the Constitution and the judicial duty to enforce the 
law.7 The power of judicial review was thus originally rooted in unwritten 
assumptions, and today rests largely on longstanding practice, rather than 
textual exegesis. Another example is the principle of state sovereign im 
munity, which the Court in Alden v. Maine identified as a broad presuppo 
sition of the Constitution that has the status of binding constitutional law, 
2. Id. at 2-3. 
3. See id. at 3-10 (discussing exclusionary rule); id. at 20-30 (same, and discussing 
Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966)). 
4. Id. at 10-17. 
5. Id. at 18-26. 
6. Id. at 27-30. 
7. See Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 176-80 (1803). For an explication 
of the background understanding that animates Marbury, see generally Philip Hamburger, 
Law and Judicial Duty (2008). 
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but does not reside in any particular text (such as the Eleventh 
Amendment) .8 
Although Professor Monaghan can be credited with the discovery of 
Type I constitutional common law, the same cannot be said of Type II 
constitutional common law. Others have noted that much of what we 
regard as supreme constitutional law has a common law quality to it.9 
Nevertheless, Monaghan has also written with great insight about certain 
manifestations of Type II constitutional common law. What I have in 
mind in particular is his magisterial article on the protective power of the 
presidency.10 There he argued that the Constitution has come to em 
body the understanding that the Executive has no inherent power to act 
with the force of law, except in emergencies to protect the Nation in 
advance of expected congressional action.11 He did not suggest that this 
principle, which has evolved over time in response to particular exigen 
cies, was r?visable by the legislature; it is not Type I constitutional com 
mon law. It is constitutional common law in the Type II sense?a princi 
ple not directly traceable to any clause in the document, but regarded as 
having the same status as the written Constitution. 
In this Essay, I extend Professor Monaghan's pioneering account of 
the "protective power" of the presidency by considering a principle of 
Type II constitutional common law that applies to a coordinate branch of 
government, what I call the "disposing power" of the legislature. By "dis 
posing power," I refer to the power of arranging, ordering, and distribut 
ing the power to act with the force of law among the different institutions 
of society. The institution that wields the disposing power determines 
who has the authority to make law and under what circumstances. It has 
the power to decide who decides.12 My claim is that American constitu 
8. 527 U.S. 706, 733-34 (1999). 
9. See, e.g., Alexander M. Bickel, The Least Dangerous Branch 106 (1962) ("The 
Framers knew . . . that nothing but disaster could result for government under a written 
constitution if it were generally accepted that the specific intent of the framers of a 
constitutional provision is ascertainable and is forever and specifically binding, subject only 
to the cumbersome process of amendment."); Thomas C. Grey, Do We Have an Unwritten 
Constitution?, 27 Stan. L. Rev. 703, 705 (1975) ("[T]he courts do appropriately apply 
values not articulated in the constitutional text, and appropriately apply them in 
determining the constitutionality of legislation."); Harry H. Wellington, Common Law 
Rules and Constitutional Double Standards: Some Notes on Adjudication, 83 Yale LJ. 221, 
285-97 (1973) (justifying development of constitutional right of privacy in terms of judicial 
identification of evolving conceptions of "conventional morality"). 
10. Henry P. Monaghan, The Protective Power of the Presidency, 93 Colum. L. Rev. 1 
(1993) [hereinafter Monaghan, Protective Power]. 
11. Id. at 10-11. 
12. See generally Neil K. Komesar, Imperfect Alternatives: Choosing Institutions in 
Law, Economics, and Public Policy 3 (1994) [hereinafter Komesar, Imperfect Alternatives] 
(describing "institutional choice" as "the decision of who decides"). The greatest 
monument to the comparative institutional perspective, and a continuing influence on 
scholars and judges, is Henry M. Hart, Jr. 8c Albert M. Sacks, The Legal Process: Basic 
Problems in the Making and Application of Law (William N. Eskridge, Jr. 8c Philip P. 
Frickey eds., Found. Press 1994). 
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tional law reflects an emerging Type II constitutional common law princi 
ple that the legislature is the exclusive repository of this disposing author 
ity. Consequently, neither the executive nor the judiciary has 
autonomous power to make law, or to take it upon itself to enforce it, 
unless delegated authority to do so by the legislature. If, as Monaghan 
persuasively argues, the President has no inherent authority to act with 
the force of law, except in emergencies,13 then the corollary is that the 
legislature has exclusive authority to delegate power to make law and to 
determine who will enforce it, except in emergencies. 
They say imitation is the sincerest form of flattery. In arguing for the 
disposing power of the legislature I will attempt to imitate?in a modest 
and incomplete way?Professor Monaghan's best work. In particular, I 
will try to imitate the Monaghan methodology, characterized by its broad 
historical sweep of vision, its attention to precedent, and its capacity to 
draw out latent principles from seemingly disparate sources. What I can 
not hope to match are the depth of knowledge and the subtlety of mind 
that Monaghan always brings to the task. 
The Essay is organized as follows. In Part II, I review, in a broad 
brush fashion, evidence in support of the emergence of the disposing 
power of the legislature as a Type II constitutional common law principle. 
Part III offers some reasons why this disposing power is justified as a core 
principle of constitutionalism. Part IV considers a potential paradox of 
Type I and Type II constitutional common law: whether the disposing 
power, a form of Type II constitutional common law, calls into question 
the legitimacy of Monaghan's Type I constitutional common law. 
II. The Emergence of the Disposing Power 
One of the most important things Professor Monaghan has taught us 
about Type II constitutional common law is that its core principles were 
not laid down for all time at the founding. Rather, they gradually re 
vealed themselves under the pressure of historical events.14 Once re 
vealed, however, these principles have an enduring force. They do not 
shift radically in response to constitutional moments,15 nor are they con 
tinually redefined in light of contemporary moral values.16 They condi 
tion and constrain the operation of government in a permanent way, al 
13. Monaghan, Protective Power, supra note 10, at 70-74. 
14. See Henry P. Monaghan, Stare Decisis and Constitutional Adjudication, 88 
Colum. L. Rev. 723, 730-34 (1988) (discussing Court decisions and stare decisis during 
New Deal); see also Monaghan, Foreword, supra note 1, at 17 (explaining Court's 
"constitutionally inspired common law" emerging from Commerce Clause cases). 
15. Cf. 1 Bruce Ackerman, We the People: Foundations 266-94 (1991) (describing 
process of "higher lawmaking" whereby "movement in constitutional politics" transforms 
initially contentious "ideological fractions" into constitutional law through Supreme Court 
delineation of "cogent doctrinal principles"). 
16. Cf. Ronald Dworkin, Law's Empire (1986) (positing model of law as integrity in 
which previous interpretations of Constitution are reconciled in light of "best" moral 
understanding of the law). 
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though our understanding of these principles continues to evolve in 
response to new events. 
So it is with the disposing power of the legislature. When the 
Constitution was ratified in 1789, few recognized that dispositions of gov 
ernmental authority were even possible beyond the allocation of powers 
prescribed by the Constitution itself.17 Today, it is familiar and well un 
derstood that legislatures can delegate power to act with the force of 
law.18 What is not as widely appreciated is that American constitutional 
law of the Type II common law variety is steadily evolving toward a further 
and significantly different understanding of delegated lawmaking: that 
the legislature has the exclusive power to delegate authority to act with the 
force of law.19 
The idea that the legislature?and only the legislature?can dispose 
of the authority to act with the force of law has emerged slowly and at 
different times in different areas of the law. This evolution cannot be 
ascribed to bursts of popular lawmaking or refinements in political moral 
ity. Rather, it is the product of the gradual unfolding of consensus about 
appropriate institutional roles. I will consider three particularly telling 
developments, taken from the history of criminal law, civil law, and ad 
ministrative law respectively. 
A. Criminal Law 
The history of criminal law provides the clearest illustration of the 
emergence of the disposing power. The United States inherited from 
England a legal system in which certain conduct was regarded as criminal 
even though it was not expressly proscribed by a written criminal code.20 
During most of the colonial era, common law crimes were regarded as a 
17. The Framers gave little attention to the possibility of delegation of powers by 
Congress, perhaps because they were more concerned with legislative aggrandizement. 
See James O. Freedman, Review: Delegation of Power and Institutional Competence, 43 
U. Chi. L. Rev. 307, 309 (1976). 
18. See generally David Schoenbrod, Power Without Responsibility: How Congress 
Abuses the People Through Delegation (1993) (discussing ubiquity of delegation); Henry 
P. Monaghan, Marbury and the Administrative State, 83 Colum. L. Rev. 1 (1983) 
[hereinafter Monaghan, Marbury and the Administrative State] (same). 
19. See Thomas W. Merrill, Rethinking Article 1, Section T. From Nondelegation to 
Exclusive Delegation, 104 Colum. L. Rev. 2097, 2101 (2004) [hereinafter Merrill, 
Rethinking] (elaborating on distinction between nondelegation and exclusive delegation). 
20. This is revealed in Blackstone's Commentaries, which does not distinguish 
between common law and statutory sources of criminal liability, but melds the two together 
under the heading of different types of crimes. See 4 William Blackstone, Commentaries 
*41-*254. As Thomas Green comments: "It would have been difficult to do otherwise. 
Statutes had intervened so often over the centuries for narrow remedial purposes that 
there was no separate body of common law as opposed to statutory offenses." Thomas A. 
Green, Introduction to 4 William Blackstone, Commentaries, at iii, xiii n.13 (Univ. Chi. 
Press 1979). 
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legitimate feature of the legal landscape.21 Largely due to disputes at the 
end of the eighteenth century over politically motivated prosecutions for 
criminal sedition, the idea of common law crimes fell under a cloud.22 
Perhaps as a delayed response to this controversy, the Supreme Court in 
United States v. Hudson &f Goodwin emphatically disapproved of the notion 
of federal common law crimes.23 The decision rested in part on federal 
ism principles?that the federal government is one of limited and enu 
merated powers. But it also sounded in separation of powers concerns. 
Even assuming that the federal government has authority over the subject 
matter, the Court stated that "[t]he legislative authority of the Union 
must first make an act a crime, affix a punishment to it, and declare the 
Court that shall have jurisdiction of the offence."24 When the Court re 
fused to accede to Justice Story's pleas to reconsider the matter a few 
years later, common law crimes?in the sense of criminal liability having 
no foundation in an act of Congress?disappeared from our federal law 
for all time.25 
At the state level, courts continued to assert authority to hear com 
mon law crimes throughout most of the nineteenth century. As the years 
wore on, however, the tide eventually turned here as well. John Jeffries, 
in a survey of the issue, could find only two reported decisions in the 
twentieth century in which courts upheld convictions based on conduct 
not made criminal by legislation.26 He concluded: "Judicial crime crea 
tion is a thing of the past."27 Today, most states have abolished common 
law crimes, "or provide that no act or omission is a crime unless made so 
21. James Henretta captures the gradual evolution of colonial thought regarding the 
appropriate source of criminal liability by recounting three episodes occurring at different 
times in the colonial era. See James A. Henretta, Magistrates, Common Law Lawyers, 
Legislators: The Three Legal Systems of British America, in 1 The Cambridge History of 
Law in America 555 (Michael Grossberg 8c Christopher L. Tomlins eds., 2008). In 1630, 
magistrates in Virginia were allowed to impose the punishment of lashing for minor 
offences on their own say-so. Id. By 1712, a Connecticut court sought the permission of 
the legislative assembly before drawing a distinction in the midst of a trial between murder 
and manslaughter. Id. By 1793, the Vermont Chief Justice could declare: "No Court, in 
this State, ought ever to pronounce the sentence of death upon the authority of a common 
law precedent, without the authority of a statute." Id. 
22. See generally Stewart Jay, Origins of Federal Common Law: Part One, 133 U. Pa. 
L. Rev. 1003, 1010 (1985) (discussing controversy over federal common law crimes in late 
eighteenth-century America and their repudiation by the Supreme Court in early 
nineteenth century). 
23. 11 U.S. (7 Cranch) 32, 32 (1813). 
24. Id. at 34. 
25. The Court declined to revisit the matter in United States v. Coolidge, 14 U.S. (1 
Wheat.) 415, 416-17 (1816), notwithstanding Justice Story's vehement objections to the 
contrary, when the Attorney General refused to argue for the overruling of Hudson ?f 
Goodwin. 
26. John Calvin Jeffries, Jr., Legality, Vagueness, and the Construction of Penal 
Statutes, 71 Va. L. Rev. 189, 194 n.13 (1985). 
27. Id. at 195. 
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by the code or applicable statute."28 A handful of states continue in the 
ory to recognize common law crimes, but only "to the extent that [they 
are] not inconsistent with the code."29 
The explanation for the abolition of common law crimes is some 
times framed in terms of concerns about fair notice and preventing arbi 
trary state action.30 These concerns are said to require that conduct sub 
ject to criminal sanctions should be clearly delineated in an authoritative 
text, which can be consulted in advance by potential offenders and public 
authorities alike. But a more fundamental explanation is grounded in 
what I have called the disposing power, and in the understanding that 
this power is housed with the legislature. Certain conduct, like murder 
and theft, is made criminal in virtually all societies. But the criminal law 
in the United States also extends to conduct as to which divergent and 
sometimes strongly opposing views have been held at different times and 
places.31 The appropriate institution for resolving contested questions 
about the basic values of society under a system of separation of powers is 
the legislature, not the courts. It took some years for this basic proposi 
tion about the ordering of political institutions to take hold. But today it 
is regarded as axiomatic. 
Just because authority to define conduct as criminal must come from 
the legislature, it does not follow that the legislature itself must do the 
defining. As Dan Kahan has argued, the abolition of common law crimes 
and related doctrines like the rule of lenity are best explained in terms of 
whether Congress has made a proper delegation of lawmaking author 
ity.32 In particular, Kahan shows that the doctrine of lenity, which re 
quires that ambiguities in criminal statutes be resolved in favor of the 
defendant, in effect returning the matter to the legislature for clarifica 
tion, is only irregularly enforced.33 He explains that this is because the 
doctrine of lenity is at war with another principle?that the legislature 
should be allowed to delegate authority to courts to fill in the details in 
criminal statutes through case-by-case interpretation.34 Kahan suggests 
28. Paul H. Robinson, Fair Notice and Fair Adjudication: Two Kinds of Legality, 154 
U. Pa. L. Rev. 335, 338-39 (2005). 
29. Id. at 339. 
30. See Jeffries, supra note 26, at 205-16 (discussing notice and rule of law principles 
and their relation to principle of legality). 
31. See Richard J. Lazarus, Meeting the Demands of Integration in the Evolution of 
Environmental Law: Reforming Environmental Criminal Law, 83 Geo. LJ. 2407, 2445 
(1995) (discussing paradoxical nature of environmental crimes, arising because 
"[c]riminal law emphasizes settled norms, while environmental law constantly changes and 
aspires for fundamental and dramatic change"). 
32. See Dan M. Kahan, Lenity and Federal Common Law Crimes, 1994 Sup. Ct. Rev. 
345, 350. 
33. See id. at 383-89 (noting "federal courts only sporadically apply lenity" and 
further exploring judicial "mechanism by which lenity has been rendered so largely 
inoperative"). 
34. See id. at 367-70 ("[LJenity is in competition with?indeed, has been largely 
eclipsed by?another basic principle of federal criminal jurisprudence .... This principle 
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that one way of reconciling these conflicting principles is by asking 
whether the gap or ambiguity that Congress has left for courts to decide 
lies in the "interior" of the space that Congress has criminalized or near 
the "boundary" between what is considered criminal and what is consid 
ered tolerable or even socially beneficial.35 Courts tend to permit delega 
tion of interior issues, but are more apt to invoke the doctrine of lenity or 
other nondelegation precepts when conduct lies near the boundary be 
tween what is socially unacceptable, and therefore criminally penalized, 
and what is socially tolerated. 
The critical point established by Kahan's study, for present purposes, 
is that delegation must take place in order to establish criminal liability. 
Strict nondelegation has been rejected. Thus, the legislature does not 
have to resolve every detail about what conduct is criminal. But disposing 
judgments are, by common consensus, ones that must be made by the 
legislature. Neither the executive nor the courts have inherent authority 
to declare something a crime. The basic question of whether to make 
conduct criminal, and whether to spell out the details in legislation or to 
delegate authority to fill in the details to some other institution, is, today, 
always a decision made by the legislature. 
The story with regard to enforcement of the criminal law is remarka 
bly parallel. The United States inherited from England a system domi 
nated by the private prosecution of crimes.36 The decision to charge 
someone with a crime was made by the victim or the victim's next of kin. 
The American colonies moved to supplement private prosecution with 
public officers dedicated to this task, and by the time of the Revolution, 
public prosecutors handled most criminal prosecutions in the United 
States.37 At the federal level, prosecutions were initially handled by local 
U.S. Attorneys, who lacked supervision from Washington.38 Congress 
holds that Congress may delegate, and courts legitimately exercise, criminal lawmaking 
authority."). 
35. Id. at 399-406 (discussing how lenity and delegating lawmaking authority affect 
rule of law principles). 
36. See John H. Langbein, The Origins of Public Prosecution at Common Law, 17 
Am. J. Legal Hist. 313, 317-18 (1973) ("For a very long time, really into the nineteenth 
century, the English relied upon a predominant, although not exclusive, component of 
private prosecution."). 
37. See Abraham S. Goldstein, Prosecution: History of the Public Prosecutor, in 3 
Encyclopedia of Crime and Justice 1286, 1286-87 (Sanford H. Kadish et al. eds., 1983) 
("[B]y the time of the American Revolution, each colony had established some form of 
public prosecution and had organized it on a local basis."). 
38. See Susan Low Bloch, The Early Role of the Attorney General in Our 
Constitutional Scheme: In the Beginning There Was Pragmatism, 1989 Duke LJ. 561, 
567-68 (noting Attorney General had no authority over U.S. Attorneys, who had sole 
authority to represent the United States in district and circuit courts). Private citizens 
nevertheless remained active in the early years, for example in urging grand juries to bring 
criminal indictments. See Harold J. Krent, Executive Control over Criminal Law 
Enforcement: Some Lessons from History, 38 Am. U. L. Rev. 275, 292-96 (1989) 
("[C]itizens in the first years under the Constitution evidently presented evidence of 
crimes directly to the grand jury. More commonly, individuals continued as at common 
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deemed it appropriate that prosecution be controlled by public officials, 
but did not see any need for unitary supervision of this function by the 
President or any alter ego of the President.39 
In time, a general consensus emerged that prosecution is a public 
function. Just as common law crimes gradually vanished from the scene, 
so did the private prosecutor. In the 1820s, with the rise of Jacksonian 
democracy, state prosecutors became elected officials, and were recog 
nized as being part of the executive branch.40 Starting with 
Massachusetts in 1849, states began questioning the propriety of private 
prosecution.41 Soon, a number of state supreme courts refused to affirm 
convictions procured by private prosecutors; other states enacted legisla 
tion outlawing private prosecutors.42 Today, only three states allow pri 
vate prosecutions without the consent or supervision of a public prosecu 
tor.43 For practical purposes, the public prosecutor has come to have a 
monopoly on criminal enforcement authority. One of many illustrations 
of this new understanding came in 1987 when the Supreme Court, exer 
cising its "supervisory authority," invalidated a criminal contempt verdict 
obtained by a private prosecutor appointed by a judge.44 The decision 
confirmed the widespread perception that private prosecution of crimes 
is anachronistic and disfavored. 
Various rationales have been offered by commentators for the move 
ment toward conferring a monopoly of prosecutorial authority on public 
officials. Private prosecutors are viewed as excessively partisan and bi 
ased, zealously seeking conviction at the expense of any and all counter 
vailing values.45 Some commentators have even suggested that permit 
ting private prosecution of crimes violates due process rights.46 Public 
law to bring evidence of crimes before magistrates and then, upon the magistrate's 
approval, to obtain a bench warrant for the defendant's arrest." (citation omitted)). 
39. See Steven G. Calabresi & Saikrishna B. Prakash, The President's Power to 
Execute the Laws, 104 Yale L.J. 541, 658 (1994) ("The U.S. Attorneys, created in the 
Judiciary Act to prosecute suits on behalf of the United States, were not put explicitly 
under the control of the Attorney General or the President"). 
40. See Goldstein, supra note 37, at 1287-88 (describing election of prosecutors "as 
an incident of the election of judges" but noting their placement "as . . . member [s] of the 
executive branch, along with other officials of local government"). 
41. Commonwealth v. Williams, 56 Mass. (2 Cush.) 582, 585 (1849) ("As a general 
rule . . . the conducting of the case before the court and jury is to be confined to the public 
prosecutor."). 
42. See Goldstein, supra note 37, at 1288 (describing state court decisions limiting 
private prosecutions). 
43. See John D. Bessler, The Public Interest and the Unconstitutionality of Private 
Prosecutors, 47 Ark. L. Rev. 511, 529-30 (1994) ("[T]he majority of jurisdictions allow 
participation only with the public prosecutor's consent and retention of control over the 
case."). 
44. Young v. United States ex rel. Vuitton et Fils S.A., 481 U.S. 787, 809 (1987). 
45. See id. at 805-06 (noting potential for impropriety associated with "promises [of] 
financial or legal rewards for a private client" also exists for private prosecutors). 
46. See Bessler, supra note 43, at 514 (arguing private prosecutors violate due process 
rights because they are not required to enforce concerns of "public interest"). 
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prosecutors are more likely to hold a broader conception of the public 
interest, balancing the needs of law enforcement against concerns for 
protecting the innocent or those who do not deserve the ordeal of being 
put to trial.47 
In functional terms, the professionalization of the prosecutorial of 
fice is an integral feature of the modern criminal justice system. That 
system produces many more potential defendants than the system can 
process through formal criminal trials.48 Inevitably, we must devise some 
mechanism for determining which subset of criminal behavior should be 
prosecuted. One mechanism would be to rely on private initiative, prose 
cuting only those crimes that elicit a private prosecutor. But this is widely 
perceived as being unacceptable because there would be no guaranteed 
match between the seriousness of the crime?and the threat that the of 
fender poses to the community?and the likelihood of prosecution. In 
stead, we use plea bargaining to determine which crimes to prosecute. 
Thus, the public prosecutor performs a screening mechanism: The 
prosecutorial office selects the strongest and most serious cases for trial, 
dismisses the weakest and least serious, and negotiates pleas in the rest. 
In order for this system to work properly, it is necessary to have a profes 
sional office that can exercise broad discretion in handling each case as it 
arises. Such an office, if it is to perform the screening in an acceptable 
fashion, must have a de facto monopoly over all criminal prosecutions. 
The broader and more fundamental point, for present purposes, is 
that we no longer think of the prosecution of crime as an inherent right 
of the victim or victim's family. It is now universally understood to be a 
public function. This was not true in 1789, when the Constitution was 
adopted, but became part of our unwritten constitution in the nineteenth 
century. And concomitantly with the understanding that prosecution is a 
public function, the legislature is understood to have broad authority to 
designate the process by which public prosecutors are selected and super 
vised. The primary reason for this may be practical rather than theoreti 
cal. As the prosecutorial function has come to be understood to require 
a public office, no institution other than the legislature has had the au 
thority to create, structure, and fund such an office. Whatever the cause, 
the understanding emerged that the legislature has an exclusive dispos 
ing authority in determining the organization of the prosecutorial office. 
B. Civil Law 
When we turn to civil law, we also see powerful evidence of the emer 
gence of the disposing power. With respect to substantive law, the Erie 
47. See Daniel Richman, Prosecutors and Their Agents, Agents and Their 
Prosecutors, 103 Colum. L. Rev. 749, 797-99 (2003) (discussing federal prosecutors as 
"reflectors of community values" and noting their "sense of perspective and unique 
commitment to procedural justice"). 
48. William J. Stuntz, Plea Bargaining and Criminal Law's Disappearing Shadow, 117 
Harv. L. Rev. 2548, 2555 (2004). 
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doctrine49 and the overruling of Swifl v. Tyson50 loom large. The Court 
announced in Erie that "[t]here is no federal general common law."51 As 
in the case of Hudson & Goodwin52 federalism concerns were a large fac 
tor in the decision. But separation of powers also lurked below the sur 
face. The Swift regime was condemned because it ultimately rested on a 
claim of inherent judicial power to declare substantive rules of common 
law, yet "no clause in the Constitution purports to confer such a power 
upon the federal courts."53 Swift was also condemned because it misread 
congressional signals, reflected in the Rules of Decision Act, about 
whether federal courts were to follow state rules of decision in all cases 
where there is no controlling federal law.54 Erie can thus be seen as a 
powerful recognition of the disposing power of the legislature, both in its 
perception that federal courts have no inherent lawmaking power, and in 
its declaration that Congress has ultimate authority to direct the federal 
courts as to the source of law to apply for resolving cases and 
controversies. 
Something called "specialized federal common law" survived Erie55 
but it is on the ropes. A turning point of sorts came in Boyle v. United 
Technologies Corp., where a bare majority of five justices, invoking federal 
common law, recognized a "Government contractor defense" in a prod 
ucts liability suit brought by the family of a deceased Marine pilot against 
a helicopter firm.56 The majority opinion, written by a then relatively 
new member of the Court, Justice Scalia, engaged in wide-ranging policy 
analysis of the consequences of products liability judgments against gov 
ernment contractors, and prescribed in detail the elements of the de 
fense.57 Justice Brennan, writing for the dissent, pointedly observed that 
Congress had declined to adopt a government contractor defense, and 
accused the majority, "unelected and unaccountable to the people," of 
usurping the legislative role in an area where it lacked "both authority 
and expertise."58 Justice Stevens, cutting to the heart of the matter, said 
that the majority had breached "a special duty to identify the proper deci 
sion maker before trying to make the proper decision."59 
49. Erie R.R. Co. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64 (1938). 
50. 41 U.S. (16 Pet.) 1 (1842). 
51. Erie, 304 U.S. at 78. 
52. See supra notes 23-25 and accompanying text. 
53. Erie, 304 U.S. at 78. 
54. Id. at 72 (holding "construction" of Act by Swift Court was "erroneous"). 
55. See Henry J. Friendly, In Praise of Erie?and of the New Federal Common Law, 39 
N.Y.U. L. Rev. 383, 405 (1964) (noting "the emergence of federal decisional law in areas of 
national concern that is truly uniform"). 
56. 487 U.S. 500, 512 (1988). 
57. Id. at 512-13 (outlining scope of defense). 
58. Id. at 515-16 (Brennan, J., dissenting). 
59. Id. at 531 (Stevens, J., dissenting). 
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Boyle now appears to be an aberration. Both before and after the 
decision, recourse to federal common law was noticeably diminishing.60 
In areas ranging from public lands61 to transboundary nuisances62 to fi 
nancial regulation,63 the Court has gradually trimmed back on the use of 
federal common law. The Court increasingly avoids invoking federal 
common law in support of its decisions, preferring to cast its rulings in 
terms of interpretation of authoritative federal texts or preemption.64 Al 
though it would be rash to declare that federal common law is dead, a 
heavy aura of illegitimacy hangs over any claim for newly minted federal 
common law rules. 
At the state level, the common law has had much broader influence 
and greater staying power. Yet even here, one can easily perceive a pow 
erful movement toward the "statutorification" of law.65 As statutes in 
creasingly become the primary source of legal duties, there are signs of 
uneasiness with judicial lawmaking that lacks any sanction from the legis 
lature. A good example is the recent campaign by the personal injury bar 
to dust off public nuisance law as a kind of "super tort" that can be 
deployed against any and all social ills, ranging from tobacco use, to re 
moval of lead paint, to sales of handguns, to use of the gasoline additive 
MTBE, to global warming.66 Occasionally, these claims have survived mo 
60. See, e.g., Paul Lund, The Decline of Federal Common Law, 76 B.U. L. Rev. 895, 
899 (1996) (noting recent pattern of Court "restricting the federal common law making 
powers of the federal courts"). 
61. Compare Hughes v. Washington, 389 U.S. 290, 292-93 (1967) (applying federal 
common law), and Bonelli Cattle Co. v. Arizona, 414 U.S. 313, 320-21 (1973) (same), with 
Oregon ex rel. State Land Bd. v. Corvallis Sand 8c Gravel Co., 429 U.S. 363, 372 (1977) 
(overruling Bonelli and applying state law). 
62. Compare Illinois v. City of Milwaukee, 406 U.S. 91, 99-100 (1972) (applying 
federal common law), with City of Milwaukee v. Illinois, 451 U.S. 304, 317 (1981) 
(declaring federal common law displaced by statutory law). 
63. Compare United States v. Kimbell Foods, Inc., 440 U.S. 715, 726 (1979) (applying 
federal common law), with O'Melveny 8c Myers v. FDIC, 512 U.S. 79, 89 (1994) (declining 
to apply federal common law), and Kamen v. Kemper Fin. Servs., Inc., 500 U.S. 90, 108-09 
(1991) (adopting state law as federal rule of decision). 
64. Justice Scalia's freewheeling, policy-based analysis in Boyle contrasts sharply with 
his subsequent decision for the Court in O'Melveny & Myers, where he declined to apply 
federal common law to determine the duty of a law firm to investigate fraud committed by 
a savings and loan client subsequently taken over by the FDIC. 512 U.S. at 89. The latter 
decision stresses the illegitimacy of lawmaking by courts, and observes that the "function of 
weighing and appraising" multiple variables is best left for the legislature. Id. 
65. See generally, Guido Calabresi, A Common Law for the Age of Statutes 5 (1982) 
("[SJtarting with the Progressive Era but with increasing rapidity since the New Deal, we 
have become a nation governed by written laws."). 
66. For an overview of these actions, see Victor E. Schwartz 8c Phil Goldberg, The Law 
of Public Nuisance: Maintaining Rational Boundaries on a Rational Tort, 45 Washburn 
LJ. 541 (2006) (discussing attempts to extend public nuisance tort liability, particularly in 
regards to product liability). The two most prominent global warming suits are 
Connecticut v. American Electric Power Co., 582 F.3d 309, 392-93 (2d Cir. 2009) 
(rejecting political question and standing objections and finding a federal common law of 
nuisance claim survives comprehensive federal legislation on air pollution), and California 
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tions to dismiss,67 and a two-member panel of the Second Circuit, in a 
decision that may be destined for reversal, recently declined to dismiss an 
ambitious lawsuit challenging greenhouse gas emissions as a public nui 
sance.68 But so far such suits have yielded no findings of liability.69 The 
days of courts inventing new common law actions to deal with widespread 
social problems may be drawing to a close. 
When considering who can call upon the authority of the courts to 
enforce rights through civil actions, the possibilities are unusually compli 
cated, and some important Monaghanian qualifications are in order. 
One is the distinction between public and private rights, and especially 
the special role of courts in protecting private rights against government 
aggression.70 Whether as a matter of construction of Article III, or of due 
process, Congress is not completely free to delegate the defense of pri 
vate rights to nonjudicial institutions.71 The Court's recent decision in 
Boumediene makes this clear with respect to rights of liberty and the sus 
pension of habeas corpus.72 Similarly, it is understood that Congress can 
not delegate authority to try crimes to a nonjudicial tribunal, and proba 
bly cannot delegate the power to take property to an administrative 
agency, certainly not without any possibility of judicial review.73 
But these important qualifications aside, history has established that 
in federal law, Congress is the gatekeeper in determining whether indi 
viduals aggrieved by government action can make their way to court to 
obtain redress of their grievances. In the nineteenth century, the con 
v. General Motors Corp., No. C06-05755 MJJ, 2007 WL 2726871, at *16 (N.D. Cal. Sept. 17, 
2007) (dismissing complaint for lack of justiciable controversy, and thus never reaching 
issue of whether federal common law recognizes plaintiffs global warming nuisance 
claim). 
67. Appellate courts in Rhode Island, California, and New Jersey permitted lead paint 
claims to go to trial. See Schwartz & Goldberg, supra note 66, at 559-60 (outlining cases 
dealing with lead paint liability). 
68. See Am. Elec. Power Co., 582 F.3d at 393. 
69. Only one tobacco suit yielded a decision on the merits. See Texas v. Am. Tobacco 
Co., 14 F. Supp. 2d 956, 973 (E.D. Tex. 1997) (rejecting public nuisance liability). 
70. See Monaghan, Marbury and the Administrative State, supra note 18, at 14-20 
("[T]here has always been in our traditions particular concern with the judicial role where 
governmental interference with the 'private rights' of 'liberty' and 'property' was 
involved."). 
71. See Gordon G. Young, Public Rights and the Federal Judicial Power: From 
Murray's Lessee Through Crowell to Schor, 35 Buff. L. Rev. 765, 849 (1986) (noting if 
"constitutional or state-created rights are at issue" adjudication must generally be subject to 
supervision of an Article III court); see also Caleb Nelson, Adjudication in the Political 
Branches, 107 Colum. L. Rev. 559, 571 (2007) (synthesizing nineteenth-century 
understanding that private rights are uniquely entitled to protection by Article III courts). 
72. Boumediene v. Bush, 128 S. Ct. 2229, 2235 (2008) (reaffirming that Congress can 
suspend writ of habeas corpus only in event of invasion or insurrection). 
73. As to criminal trials, the Constitution itself requires a "public trial" by an 
"impartial jury." See U.S. Const, amend. VI; see also id. art. Ill, ? 2, cl. 2. On judicial 
review where takings of property are involved, see Henry P. Monaghan, Constitutional Fact 
Review, 85 Colum. L. Rev. 229, 247-63 (1985). 
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cepts of jurisdiction and sovereign immunity ensured that Congress main 
tained a disposing authority over civil litigation involving federal rights. 
Marbury v. Madison74 to the limited extent it was cited in the nineteenth 
century, was authority for the proposition that mandamus may not issue 
unless a court has been given jurisdiction to issue the writ.75 Over time, 
these limitations on access to courts have diminished in importance, al 
though it is generally acknowledged that they could be revived if 
Congress so desired.76 
In the twentieth century, the more interesting issue concerns the re 
quirement that a claimant must have a cause of action, and in particular 
whether courts have authority to recognize "implied" private rights of ac 
tion to enforce regulatory statutes.77 The sequence of events here is fa 
miliar. Early in the twentieth century, in Texas & Pacific Railway Co. v. 
Rigsby, the Court broadly suggested that the beneficiaries of a federal reg 
ulatory statute always enjoy an implied cause of action to enforce the stat 
ute, since every right presumes a remedy.78 Later, the Warren Court pro 
nounced that private rights of action should be implied so long as this 
would promote the purposes of Congress in enacting the statute.79 The 
Burger Court, as was its wont, introduced a four-factor balancing test for 
determining whether to imply a private right of action; congressional in 
tent was one factor.80 The doctrine reached a turning point in 1979, 
when Justice Powell authored a powerful dissent in Cannon v. University of 
Chicago, arguing that the practice of implying private rights of action vio 
lates principles of separation of powers.81 According to Powell, "[w]hen 
Congress chooses not to provide a private civil remedy, federal courts 
should not assume the legislative role of creating such a remedy and 
thereby enlarge their jurisdiction."82 With the Rehnquist and then the 
Roberts Courts, the Powell dissent in Cannon has effectively become the 
law, as the Court has emphasized only a single factor in determining 
whether to recognize a private right of action: whether Congress in 
tended to create such an action.83 Today, there appears to be a broad 
74. 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137 (1803). 
75. Thomas W. Merrill, Marbury v. Madison as the First Great Administrative Law 
Decision, 37 J. Marshall L. Rev. 481, 485 (2004). 
76. See generally Gerald Gunther, Congressional Power to Curtail Federal Court 
Jurisdiction: An Opinionated Guide to the Ongoing Debate, 36 Stan. L. Rev. 895, 916 
(1984). 
77. See Thomas W. Merrill, The Common Law Powers of Federal Courts, 52 U. Chi. 
L. Rev. 1, 48-53 (1985) [hereinafter Merrill, Common Law Powers] (providing overview of 
implied remedies). 
78. 241 U.S. 33, 39-40 (1916). 
79. J.I. Case Co. v. Borak, 377 U.S. 426, 432-33 (1964). 
80. Cort v. Ash, 422 U.S. 66, 78 (1975). 
81. 441 U.S. 677, 730 (1979) (Powell, J., dissenting). 
82. Id. at 730-31. 
83. See, e.g., Home v. Flores, 129 S. Ct. 2579, 2598 n.6 (2009) (noting No Child Left 
Behind Act "does not provide a private right of action" and thus "is enforceable only by the 
agency charged with administering it"); Stoneridge Inv. Partners v. Scientific Atlanta, 552 
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consensus on the Court in support of this precept, although no majority 
opinion has yet to enforce Justice Scalia's position that any cause of ac 
tion must be found in the express language of the statute, not derived by 
inference from legislative history.84 
It is no coincidence that as the authority of courts to declare implied 
rights of action has waned, express legislative authorization of "citizen 
suits" to enforce statutory rights has flourished. The environmental laws 
are a prime example. These statutes typically include express causes of 
action allowing citizens to sue the government for the failure to perform 
"nondiscretionary" duties and polluters who are in violation of permit 
conditions or administrative orders.85 Citizen suit provisions spell out in 
detail how private actions are to be coordinated with public actions, 
where suits should be filed, what remedies are available, and whether 
awards of attorneys' fees are possible. The example of these statutes un 
doubtedly has helped persuade the Court that it is best to leave the allo 
cation of civil enforcement authority for Congress to determine.86 
In short, the twentieth-century history of civil law is broadly parallel 
to the nineteenth-century history of criminal law. In both instances, the 
original understanding tolerated and even encouraged judge-made rights 
and private enforcement of rights without the express sanction of the 
legislature. In both instances, this understanding changed over time, in 
response to growing recognition that both the creation of rights and the 
designation of enforcement authority entail highly contested policy ques 
tions about the disposition of governmental authority. In both instances, 
political actors?including both courts and legislatures?gradually came 
to the conclusion that the disposition of authority must be controlled by 
the legislature. 
U.S. 148, 162-63 (2008) (holding Congress did not intend for private right of action for 
securities fraud to extend to liability for aiders and abettors). 
84. See Thompson v. Thompson, 484 U.S. 174, 191^92 (1988) (Scalia, J., concurring) 
(arguing for shift from congressional intent test to "categorical position that federal private 
rights of action will not be implied"); cf. Alexander v. Sandoval, 532 U.S. 275, 291 (2001) 
(declining to recognize implied right of action to enforce administrative regulations issued 
under statute as to which the Court had previously recognized implied private right of 
action and observing there was "no evidence anywhere in the text to suggest that Congress 
intended to create a private right" of action). 
85. See, e.g., Clean Water Act, 33 U.S.C. ? 1365 (2006) (authorizing civil action by 
"any citizen" alleging point source of pollution is in violation of permit or order or alleging 
that Administrator has failed to perform nondiscretionary duty); Clean Air Act, 42 U.S.C. 
? 7604 (2006) (authorizing civil action by "any person" under similar circumstances). 
86. The connection is made explicit in Middlesex County Sewerage Authority v. 
National Sea Clammers Ass'n, 453 U.S. 1, 14 (1981), where the Court, after describing the 
citizen suit provisions in the Clean Water Act, observed that "[i]n view of these elaborate 
enforcement provisions it cannot be assumed that Congress intended to authorize by 
implication additional judicial remedies for private citizens." 
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C. The Allocation of Administrative Authority 
My third example is the most recent instantiation of the disposing 
power and takes us into the twenty-first century. The question involves 
the allocation of legal authority between courts and administrative 
agencies. 
One controversy that pushed this question to the fore erupted in the 
1970s. This was whether courts could impose additional procedural re 
quirements on agencies in order to assure that adequate consideration 
was given to issues on the frontiers of scientific knowledge. Several D.C. 
Circuit judges, in both judicial and extra-judicial writing, argued in favor 
of such inherent judicial power.87 The Supreme Court would have none 
of it. In Vermont Yankee Nuclear Power Corp. v. Natural Resources Defense 
Council, Inc., the Court held that the procedures set forth in the 
Administrative Procedure Act are "the maximum procedural require 
ments which Congress was willing to have the courts impose upon agen 
cies in conducting rulemaking procedures."88 Accordingly, the Court 
concluded, courts have no authority to "engraft [ ] their own notions of 
proper procedures upon agencies entrusted with substantive functions by 
Congress."89 This was an emphatic endorsement of the disposing power. 
Congress gets to decide who will decide what procedures an agency will 
follow in discharging its regulatory functions. If Congress sets down statu 
tory minima, and allows agencies to determine whether to adopt addi 
tional procedures beyond the statutory minima, then courts are required 
to respect this allocation of decisional authority.90 
An even more far-reaching controversy involves the allocation of au 
thority between courts and agencies to "say what the law is" when the 
statute the agency administers is unclear. For the first two hundred years 
of our constitutional history, it was assumed that the courts have inherent 
authority to determine the allocation of interpretational power.91 Then, 
in 1984, the Supreme Court decided Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural 
Resources Defense Council, Inc.92 Chevron broke new ground by recognizing 
that the resolution of interpretational disputes, when statutes are unclear, 
87. See generally Antonin Scalia, Vermont Yankee: The APA, the D.C. Circuit, and the 
Supreme Court, 1978 Sup. Ct. Rev. 345 (providing overview of internal D.C. Circuit 
debate). 
88. 435 U.S. 519, 524 (1978). 
89. Id. at 525. 
90. See Jack M. Beermann 8c Gary Lawson, Reprocessing Vermont Yankee, 75 Geo. 
Wash. L. Rev. 856, 858 (2007) (describing this as "canonical understanding" of Vermont 
Yankee). 
91. See Colin S. Diver, Statutory Interpretation in the Administrative State, 133 U. Pa. 
L. Rev. 549, 562 n.95 (1985) (listing factors cited by Court in determining whether to grant 
deference to administrative action); Thomas W. Merrill, Judicial Deference to Executive 
Precedent, 101 Yale LJ. 969, 972 (1992) (discussing pre-Chevron "multiple factors regime" 
for determining when deference to agency statutory interpretation is appropriate). 
92. 467 U.S. 837 (1984). 
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entails a judgment about appropriate public policy.93 It also broke 
ground by holding that in certain circumstances, deference to reasonable 
agency interpretations is required, not discretionary.94 But Chevron did 
not explain exactly what those circumstances were. Was such deference 
required when issues of law application were involved, as opposed to pure 
questions of law?95 Was it required when agencies have some special ex 
pertise in the subject matter?96 Was it required in any case where the 
agency could plausibly claim it has greater accountability to the public 
than an Article III court has?97 
In three important decisions rendered at the dawn of the twenty-first 
century, the Court finally began to answer these questions. The decisions 
were United States v. Mead Corp.,98 Gonzales v. Oregon,99 and National Cable 
& Telecommunications Ass'n v. Brand XInternet Services.100 These decisions 
establish in effect that the allocation of interpretational authority is to be 
determined by Congress. As Mead put it, the Chevron framework applies 
to an agency interpretation when Congress has delegated authority to the 
agency to act with the force of law, and the agency interpretation was 
rendered in the exercise of that authority.101 Gonzales added that the 
agency must be acting within the scope of its delegated authority.102 
Brand X held that C/^ron-eligible agency interpretations trump prior in 
consistent judicial interpretations.103 
With this trio of decisions, the Court assimilated the Chevron doc 
trine to the disposing power of the legislature. Chevron only applies when 
Congress decides it applies, which it does by expressly delegating the ap 
propriate authority to the agency. The Court, in laying down some prin 
ciples for allocating interpretational authority among competing institu 
93. Id. at 865-66. 
94. Id. at 843-44. 
95. See Negusie v. Holder, 129 S. Ct. 1159, 1170-76 (2009) (Stevens, J., concurring in 
part and dissenting in part) (arguing question before Court is a "pure question of statutory 
construction for the courts to decide" and therefore not one delegated to administrative 
agency (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting INS v. Cardoza-Fonseca, 480 U.S. 421, 
446 (1987))); Cardoza-Fonseca, 480 U.S. at 446, 448 (noting difference between "a pure 
question of statutory construction for the court to decide" and "the question of 
interpretation that arises in each case in which the agency" applies standard to set of facts). 
96. See Chevron, 467 U.S. at 865 (noting that in light of "manifestly competing 
interests" it is reasonable to surmise that Congress "desired the Administrator to strike the 
balance at this level, thinking that those with great expertise and charged with 
responsibility for administering the provision would be in a better position to do so"). 
97. See Antonin Scalia, Judicial Deference to Administrative Interpretations of Law, 
1989 Duke LJ. 511, 518 ("[I]t seems to me desirable that . . . continuing political 
accountability be assured [ ] through direct political pressures upon the Executive and . . . 
congressional oversight"). 
98. 533 U.S. 218 (2001). 
99. 546 U.S. 243 (2006). 
100. 545 U.S. 967 (2005). 
101. Mead, 533 U.S. at 226-27. 
102. Gonzales, 546 U.S. at 258. 
103. Brand X, 545 U.S. at 982-83. 
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tions, has prescribed a set of signals that can be used by Congress to 
resolve the question of which entity has primary interpretational author 
ity. Interestingly, Congress did not devise the signals itself, and presuma 
bly did not even know about them when it enacted most of the statutes 
that are now to be examined to see what signal it sent. Nevertheless, the 
Court has acknowledged that Congress is the correct institution to resolve 
questions about the allocation of policymaking authority, i.e., to decide 
who decides. And the Court has identified a set of signals that Congress 
can deploy in carrying out this function, including default rules that ap 
ply when no clear signal is sent. All of this invites, but does not compel, 
Congress to assume the role of deciding who decides. 
Congress episodically decides that it should be the decider, some 
times in microscopic and misguided detail, rather than concentrating on 
disposing governmental authority. And the courts are all too often 
tempted to resolve matters themselves, rather than attending to signals 
from Congress that suggest they should be resolved elsewhere. Many im 
portant questions, such as who has authority to preempt state law and 
under what circumstances, do not yet have a definitive set of signals iden 
tified for Congress to follow.104 But, in administrative law, as in criminal 
and civil law more generally, the Court has made a start toward recogniz 
ing the disposing power of Congress. 
I do not mean to suggest that the disposing power reigns everywhere 
triumphant. I have described it rather as an emerging postulate of Type 
II constitutional common law. As my examples suggest, it has been 
emerging since the early years of the nineteenth century. It still has a way 
to go, yet we can clearly discern the outlines of a major principle of un 
written constitutional law. The role of the legislature is not necessarily to 
resolve contested questions of policy itself, but to clarify who is to make 
policy and over what domain. And only the legislature may exercise this 
disposing power. 
III. Justifying the Disposing Power 
If I am correct that the disposing power of the legislature is an 
emerging postulate of Type II common law constitutionalism, the ques 
tion remains whether this is a desirable development. Can we identify a 
more general justification for the gradual recognition of the dominant 
role of the legislative branch in coordinating the exercise of policymak 
ing authority in society? 
The extensive literature on the delegation doctrine suggests that per 
haps the underlying principle is grounded in ideas about institutional 
104. The Court began to make headway in this direction in Wyeth v. Levine, where it 
held that agency views about the preemptive effect of federal law are generally entitled to 
an intermediate level of deference, rather than strong Chevron-style deference. 129 S. Ct. 
1187, 1201 (2009). 
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legitimacy.105 As a matter of separation of powers, determining who will 
make law for society, and how it will be enforced, are questions of far 
reaching consequence. The resolution of such questions has traditionally 
been vested in the legislature. The legislature is also the branch of gov 
ernment most closely associated with the voice of the people, and in a 
democracy it is fitting that basic questions about the allocation and en 
forcement of power should be determined by the most democratic 
body.106 
The proponents of a resurrected nondelegation doctrine would ar 
gue that these considerations of legitimacy dictate that the legislature 
should not dispose of critical questions of policy at all, but should decide 
them itself. For better or worse, however, strict nondelegation has 
proven unworkable?and undesirable?as a constitutional precept.107 
Just as constitutional common law has given us new understandings not 
perceived at the founding, it has taken away the original understanding 
(if indeed it was such) that the legislature may not delegate the authority 
to make law.108 Yet when lawmaking and law enforcing authority can be 
delegated, the considerations of legitimacy that make strict nondelega 
tion an alluring if unattainable ideal surely suggest that higher order 
questions about when and what to delegate should not themselves be del 
egated. In a world of widespread delegation, the most important policy 
decisions are those that concern who gets to make laws and how they are 
to be enforced. The legislature, as the body most closely associated with 
105. See Sotorios Barber, The Constitution and the Delegation of Congressional 
Power 37 (1975) (explaining how nondelegation principle follows from principle that 
"neither the government nor any of its parts should change constitutional arrangement of 
officers and powers"); Martin H. Redish, The Constitution as Political Structure 138-43 
(1995) ("Unlimited legislative delegation to administrative agencies effectively undermines 
all three of the instrumental values that underlie the political structure dictated by the 
Constitution: diversification, accountability, and checking."); Schoenbrod, supra note 18, 
at 13-18 (discussing impact of delegation on democratic process, liberty, and protection of 
population). 
106. See, e.g., Victoria F. Nourse, Toward a New Constitutional Anatomy, 56 Stan. L. 
Rev. 835, 850-57 (2004) (emphasizing close constitutive relationship between the people 
and the legislature). 
107. See, e.g., Merrill, Rethinking, supra note 19, at 2103-09 and sources cited 
therein (noting that "notwithstanding the modern Court's occasional flirtation with 
stricter enforcement of separation-of-powers requirements," nondelegation challenges are 
now uniformly rejected). 
108. For debate about the original understanding regarding nondelegation, compare 
Larry Alexander & Saikrishna Prakash, Reports of the Nondelegation Doctrine's Death are 
Greatly Exaggerated, 70 U. Chi. L. Rev. 1297, 1298 (2003) (interpreting nondelegation 
principle as limiting all rulemaking power of legislators elected by the people), and Gary 
Lawson, Delegation and Original Meaning, 88 Va. L. Rev. 327, 333 (2002) (emphasizing 
Constitution's "discernible, textually grounded nondelegation principle"), with Eric A. 
Posner 8c Adrian Vermeule, Interring the Nondelegation Doctrine, 69 U. Chi. L. Rev. 1721, 
1723 (2002) (interpreting nondelegation principle as barring only delegation of voting or 
de jure legislative powers to third parties), and Eric A. Posner & Adrian Vermeule, 
Nondelegation: A Post-Mortem, 70 U. Chi. L. Rev. 1331, 1331-32 (2003) (same). 
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the resolution of important policy questions, is clearly the proper institu 
tion to make these higher order judgments about the allocation of 
power.109 
These concerns about legitimacy are obviously important. But I 
would also emphasize a more practical set of considerations. If delega 
tion of lawmaking and law enforcing authority is permitted, the legisla 
ture is the only feasible institution for coordinating the exercise of gov 
ernmental authority. Only the legislature has the authority to resolve 
questions of institutional choice and timing in a way that is binding on all 
other institutions. Only the legislature has the capacity to select among 
the full range of regulatory targets and tools. Likewise, only the legisla 
ture has the ability to implement the choices made in ways that are com 
prehensive and fair. In other words, the disposing power must be given 
to the legislature because we have no other feasible option. 
Lawyers and especially law professors are apt to nominate the courts 
to be the institution that should perform the function of integrating and 
coordinating competing claims of authority to act with the force of law.110 
This is not just because they have the most familiarity and influence with 
courts, although I am sure these factors play a role. A more fundamental 
explanation is the yearning to resolve questions about the allocation of 
lawmaking authority through "reasoned elaboration" rather than brute 
politics.111 Courts, as the "forum of principle," hold forth the promise 
that questions of institutional roles can be resolved by disinterested argu 
ment. Lawyers and law professors are naturally drawn to this prospect. 
The courts unquestionably have considerable assets weighing in their 
favor in deciding who decides. They have a long tradition of exercising 
impartial judgment, which gives them a strong claim to be able to play 
the role of the umpire.112 In addition, the sorting out process will inevita 
bly involve the interpretation of authoritative texts, including the 
Constitution, federal statutes, federal regulations, and state laws. Courts 
have a well-established reputation as interpretative specialists, and so on 
109. The proponents of a resurrected nondelegation doctrine argue in a variety of 
ways that the legislature should decide all issues that are sufficiently "important." See 
Lawson, supra note 108, at 360-61. In a world in which delegation is permitted, the issues 
that are sufficiently important to be decided by the legislature are issues about when, 
where, and to whom to delegate. 
110. See, e.g., Peter L. Strauss, On Resegregating the Worlds of Statute and Common 
Law, 1994 Sup. Ct. Rev. 429, 437 (depicting courts as institutions that orchestrate 
administrative and judicial interpretations in dynamic, integrative fashion). 
111. This of course is a fundamental aspiration of the legal process school. See Hart 
& Sacks, supra note 12, at 145-52 (positing allocation of authority through "reasoned 
elaboration"). 
112. See Komesar, Imperfect Alternatives, supra note 12, at 128 (noting greater 
independence of judges allows courts to resolve controversies "without some of the biases 
and pressures that distort other institutions"). 
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this dimension too it is logical to think that they should be the ones who 
decide who decides.113 
Nevertheless, courts labor under some very serious limitations that 
disable them from exercising the integrative function on a comprehen 
sive basis. I will emphasize three. 
First, courts do not have the institutional capacity to oversee the allo 
cation of institutional authority on a comprehensive basis. The 
U.S. Supreme Court today decides only about eighty cases per year.114 
Most adjudication that implicates institutional authority occurs in one of 
the lower federal courts or, even more likely, in the state courts. If the 
lower courts are divided, or if they have addressed only part of the prob 
lem but not all of it, the allocation of authority may remain unresolved. 
Even the Supreme Court's decisions may be narrow ones that fail to ad 
dress all dimensions of the problem, or may be unstable if the Court is 
closely divided and personnel changes occur.115 Moreover, there is every 
reason to believe that the problem of constrained judicial capacity will 
only grow worse with time. As Neil Komesar has observed: "As numbers 
and complexity increase, judicial activity will decrease relative to the activ 
ity of larger institutions such as the market and the political process .... 
Even the most activist U.S. courts have been able to review only very lim 
ited categories of government actions."116 
Second, courts can enter the fray only ex post, after some dispute has 
broken out between two or more entities over which department of gov 
ernment is to have primary or ultimate policymaking authority over a par 
ticular issue. After Oregon gets into a fight with Attorney General 
Ashcroft about whether to permit physician-assisted suicide, we can call 
on the courts to sort things out and declare who has authority to decide 
113. See Thomas W. Merrill, Preemption and Institutional Choice, 102 Nw. U. L. Rev. 
727, 758 (2008) ("[T]he courts have a strong tradition of engaging in principled 
interpretation."). 
114. See David Stras, The Supreme Court's Gatekeepers: The Role of Law Clerks in 
the Certiorari Process, 85 Tex. L. Rev. 947, 965-68 (2007) (discussing decline in number 
of signed opinions per term and percentage of cases in which certiorari is granted by 
Court). 
115. Preemption of state regulation of cigarette advertising is an example of an area 
in which the Supreme Court's understanding of the allocation of authority remains 
unsteady and hence unresolved. Compare Cipollone v. Liggett Group, Inc., 505 U.S. 504, 
524-25 (1992) (holding state tort law is sometimes preempted), and Lorillard Tobacco Co. 
v. Reilly, 533 U.S. 525, 550-51 (2001) (holding state regulation preempted), with Altria 
Group, Inc. v. Good, 129 S. Ct. 538, 551 (2008) (holding state tort liability not preempted). 
Likewise, consider the Supreme Court's decisions on whether state tort liability for FDA 
approved medical devices and drugs is preempted. Compare Wyeth v. Levine, 129 S. Ct. 
1187, 1203-04 (2009) (holding tort liability not preempted), and Medtronic, Inc. v. Lohr, 
518 U.S. 470, 486-87 (1996) (same), with Riegel v. Medtronic, Inc., 128 S. Ct. 999, 1007-08 
(2008) (holding tort liability preempted). 
116. Neil K. Komesar, Law's Limits: The Rule of Law and the Supply and Demand of 
Rights 165-66 (2001). 
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the matter.117 But what are we going to do before the courts rule, or in 
the many cases where there is no court ruling at all? What if no one has 
standing to sue, or the issue is a political question, or no one group cares 
strongly enough to finance litigation? We need an institution to decide 
who decides that is always on call, and is not limited to justiciable 
controversies. 
Third, the courts have a severely limited base of information on 
which to decide who decides. Choosing institutions entails resolving em 
pirical questions, policy questions, and outright political questions based 
on predictions about how different institutions will handle the issues 
placed before them. Judges, who spend much of their time with their 
noses in law books, may not be particularly well suited to make these em 
pirical and predictive judgments.118 
Given these inherent limitations of courts, one is tempted to turn to 
the executive branch to perform the role of integrating regulatory au 
thority in the modern administrative state. The President has been 
widely praised as the representative of all the people, and is said to enjoy 
a unique degree of legitimacy in setting the political agenda for the na 
tion.119 And Presidents have begun to play an integrative function, most 
conspicuously through oversight of major agency rulemaking by the 
Office of Information and Regulatory Affairs within the Office of 
Management and Budget. Although early versions of this oversight were 
confined to asking whether the benefits of proposed rules exceed their 
costs, commentators have noted that this review could be expanded to 
include more wide-ranging policy variables.120 Moreover, the President 
and his staff are not plagued by the weaknesses endemic to courts. The 
President can act in anticipation of problems, can address problems in a 
comprehensive fashion, and has access to much more information than 
do the courts. One can thus perceive the outlines of an argument for 
assigning the task of deciding who decides to the President. 
A moment's reflection, however, also reveals the weaknesses of the 
President as the source of the disposing power. The President has no 
117. See Gonzales v. Oregon, 546 U.S. 243, 274-75 (2006) (invalidating federal 
interpretative rule that would have effectively blocked state laws permitting physician 
assisted suicide). 
118. See generally Adrian Vermeule, Judging Under Uncertainty: An Institutional 
Theory of Legal Interpretation 153-68 (2006) (emphasizing limitations of courts in terms 
of empirical knowledge). 
119. See, e.g., Steven G. Calabresi, Some Normative Arguments for the Unitary 
Executive, 48 Ark. L. Rev. 23, 58-63 (1995) ("[T]he President is unique in our 
constitutional system as being the only official who is accountable to a national voting 
electorate and no one else."); Elena Kagan, Presidential Administration, 114 Harv. L. Rev. 
2245, 2331-39 (2001) ("[P] residential leadership establishes an electoral link between the 
public and the bureaucracy, increasing the latter's responsiveness to the former."). 
120. See Nicholas Bagley & Richard L. Revesz, Centralized Oversight of the 
Regulatory State, 106 Colum. L. Rev. 1260, 1312-24 (2006) (providing history of OIRA 
review and recommending standard be expanded beyond narrow cost-benefit analysis). 
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inherent authority to make law, create institutions, set appropriation 
levels, or allocate enforcement authority among rival institutions. The 
President is utterly dependent on Congress for all of this. The President 
may be able to oversee rulemaking by agencies, and even bring a degree 
of coherence to different regulatory initiatives. But the President cannot 
create the agencies that engage in the rulemaking, establish the legal au 
thority under which they act, give them a budget with which to gather 
information and policy alternatives, or determine when and how the re 
sulting rules will be enforced. If courts are interstitial lawmakers, then 
the President is at best an interstitial wielder of the disposing power. 
Given these limitations of courts and executives, the only conceivable 
institution to task with deciding who decides is the legislature. Here, I 
can do no better than to quote an eminent legal authority: 
Congress has ... a special ability to develop and consider the 
factual basis of a problem. More importantly, it has the ability to 
make either rough or finely tuned distinctions, justified by prac 
tical considerations though perhaps not by principle, in a man 
ner not generally thought open to a court. In addition, 
Congress has at its command a range of remedies exceeding 
those available to a court from which it can craft a solution for a 
problem. These include wholesale suspension of offending 
state law, the formulation of rules to be enforced by courts, edu 
cation programs, administrative schemes, and spending pro 
grams. In contrast ... a court is limited in its capacity to affect 
the behavior of those not before it. And a common law court 
can seldom do more than announce a rule and create a sanction 
for its violation.121 
I would add to this list that the legislature can allocate decisional 
responsibility ex ante, before disputes arise, rather than waiting until dis 
putes arise and acting ex post. The legislature can act comprehensively, 
deciding all or nearly all relevant questions about decisional responsibil 
ity in a single legislative act, rather than proceeding incrementally in bits 
and pieces. The legislature, under the principle of legislative supremacy, 
can bind the other branches of government to its allocative decisions. 
One particularly important legislative body?the United States 
Congress?has the authority under the Supremacy Clause to resolve con 
flicts between the federal government and the states.122 Finally, the legis 
lature is composed of elected politicians and therefore should be collec 
tively well-informed and sensitive to the political implications of deciding 
who decides. 
In endorsing the legislature as the decider of who decides, I am not 
claiming that the legislature will discharge this function in a fashion that 
will inspire those who yearn for reasoned elaboration or principled deci 
sionmaking. The decision to award the disposing power to Congress is 
121. Monaghan, Foreword, supra note 1, at 28-29 (citations omitted). 
122. U.S. Const, art. VI, cl. 2. 
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grounded in necessity, not a prediction about the merits of the choices 
that will be made. No other institution can perform this function. There 
fore, we should bow to necessity and support the legislature in the dis 
charge of this function. Resistance?whether in the form of assertions of 
inherent executive authority or judicial invalidation of legislative choices 
in the name of the Constitution?will in the end only lead to greater 
uncertainty about the allocation of authority among the institutions of 
society. 
This does not mean that the courts have no role in the institutional 
choice process. But I would argue their primary role should be one of 
enforcing the authority of the legislature to make choices about regulatory 
targets, institutions, tools, and timing. Provided courts perform this im 
portant backstopping function, there is no reason why the legislature can 
not decide in particular circumstances that the courts should play a 
frontline role in regulating specific problems that warrant governmental 
intervention. If Congress wants to give the courts authority to resolve a 
particular problem, whether it be eliminating workplace discrimination 
or even combating climate change, the courts should take up the chal 
lenge and perform as best they can. But courts should take on these tasks 
only if the legislature has first affirmatively chosen to delegate responsibil 
ity to them to perform this function. 
IV. The Disposing Power and the Fate of Type I Constitutional 
Common Law 
History has not been kind to Type I constitutional common law, the 
peculiar type of constitutional common law first identified by Professor 
Monaghan in his 1975 Harvard Law Review Foreword.123 In his foreword, 
Monaghan used the Miranda warnings as one of the principal illustrations 
of Type I constitutional common law. The Supreme Court rejected this 
characterization in Dickerson v. United States, where it held that Miranda is 
not based on constitutional common law but rather is grounded in the 
Court's understanding of the Constitution itself.124 In so ruling, the 
Court dealt a severe blow to Type I constitutional common law. If we 
follow Dickerson in conceiving of Miranda as a species of Marbury-style re 
view, then little space is left for Type I constitutional common law. 
Dickerson can be seen as a kind of judicial power grab; the Court de 
cided it did not want to share power with Congress when it comes to 
implementing the Constitution's limits on compulsory self-incrimination. 
On this view, the Court slammed the door on Type I constitutional com 
mon law, with its appealing vision of experimentalism and a division of 
123. See supra notes 1-3 8c 7 and accompanying text (introducing Type I and Type II 
constitutional common law). 
124. 530 U.S. 428, 431-32 (2000) (refusing to follow federal statute that made 
confessions admissible without regard to compliance with Miranda warnings if voluntary 
under all circumstances). 
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labor based on relative competencies, because the Court was anxious to 
preserve its monopoly over the prescription of rules for enforcing these 
sorts of constitutional rights. 
Yet I think there is a deeper explanation for the Court's rejection of 
Type I constitutional common law in Dickerson, an explanation that brings 
us back to Type II constitutional common law and the disposing power of 
the legislature. Type I constitutional common law, as Monaghan made 
clear, was modeled on federal common law. Federal common law, at 
least in its purest manifestations, is grounded in the assumption of the 
judiciary's inherent lawmaking authority.125 As we have seen, however, 
the disposing power of the legislature has implications for any claim of 
inherent legal authority, whether by the executive or the courts. The dis 
posing power effectively means the judiciary has no inherent authority to 
act with the force of law. It must trace its authority to exercise legal au 
thority to some source in enacted law, most typically a delegation from 
the legislature.126 If the federal legislature, Congress, has exclusive au 
thority to delegate power to make and enforce law, then much of what is 
called federal common law?federal common law grounded in a claim of 
inherent authority to make law?is unconstitutional. 
In short, starting with the Type II constitutional common law that 
Monaghan identified as the "protective power" of the presidency,127 it is 
but a short step to the "disposing power" of the legislature.128 From 
there, we can see that the federal common law, at least in its purest form, 
is problematic. This in turn suggests that Type I constitutional common 
law, which is based on federal common law, is problematic. 
I am not suggesting that the Court in Dickerson engaged in any ex 
plicit process of reasoning along these lines. But Type II constitutional 
common law?which after all is regarded as the supreme law of the 
land?can exert a powerful constraining force on the judicial mind. It is 
possible the Dickerson Court perceived, on some level, that Type I consti 
tutional common law, for all its appealing modesty and its invitation to 
share power with the legislature, reflects a model of the judicial role that 
violates an emerging understanding disfavoring claims of inherent judi 
cial authority to make law.129 The Type II principle that calls into doubt 
claims of inherent lawmaking authority by either the executive or the ju 
diciary is the legislature's disposing power. 
125. By "purest manifestation" of federal common law, I mean a claim of authority to 
create federal rules of decision based solely on the court's inherent authority, rather than 
on authority grounded in an implied delegation, or the need to preempt state law to 
preserve the integrity of federal law. Thomas W. Merrill, The Judicial Prerogative, 12 Pace 
L. Rev. 327, 328-29 (1992). 
126. See supra notes 105-106 and accompanying text. 
127. Monaghan, Protective Power, supra note 10, at 11. 
128. See supra note 12 and accompanying text. 
129. See Dickerson, 530 U.S. at 438-39 (noting federal courts have no "supervisory" 
authority over state courts and so their authority to impose procedural requirements on 
states must be grounded in Constitution). 
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Does this mean that all of Professor Monaghan's Type I constitu 
tional common law is illegitimate? Not necessarily. Much of what has 
been called federal common law can be sustained as resting on an im 
plied delegation to courts or on the need to preempt state law to preserve 
enacted law from being frustrated.130 Some exercises of Type I constitu 
tional common law can perhaps be sustained on the same basis. The 
Bivens action,131 which is r?visable by Congress, is a possible candidate for 
viable Type I constitutional common law, even after Dickersons rejection 
of the concept in the context of the Miranda warnings. Nevertheless, 
when we consider Type I constitutional common law in light of the dis 
posing power, there is no doubt that some significant trimming back of 
Type I constitutional common law is required.132 
If the disposing power renders Type I constitutional common law 
problematic, why does it not do the same for Type II constitutional com 
mon law? The disposing power rests on the idea that any exercise of 
governmental authority must be grounded in a clear delegation of au 
thority in enacted law, whether it be an act of Congress or the 
Constitution itself. But the disposing power, like other forms of Type II 
constitutional law, cannot be found in the constitutional text. Why then 
does the disposing power not turn on and invalidate itself? 
Perhaps the answer lies in the fact that Type II constitutional com 
mon law tends to be grounded in widespread consensus. Propositions of 
Type II constitutional common law tend to reflect practices and tradi 
tions that enjoy broad public support and are recognized as legitimate by 
all three branches of government.133 Type I constitutional common law, 
in contrast, tends more often to take on the aspect of unilaterally de 
clared "judicial legislation." In the end, though, there remains a deep 
paradox here. We have slowly evolved, in the common law fashion, to 
ward an understanding that the executive and judicial branches must 
trace their power to act to some authoritative written text, either a provi 
sion of the written Constitution or a law passed by Congress. That 
evolved understanding, in turn, seems to call into question an important 
mode of American constitutional lawmaking, which is to develop under 
130. See Merrill, Common Law Powers, supra note 77, at 60-61 ("The principal 
feature distinguishing implied delegated lawmaking under the Constitution is that the 
delegation comes directly from the framers."). 
131. See Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of Fed. Bureau of Narcotics, 403 U.S. 
388, 389 (1971) (recognizing cause of action for damages for violation of plaintiff s Fourth 
Amendment rights by federal drug agents). 
132. Merrill, Common Law Powers, supra note 77, at 66-69 (discussing delegation of 
lawmaking power to federal courts under different constitutional amendments). 
133. For a persuasive account that three-branch cooperation was necessary in 
establishing the institution of judicial review?a prime example of Type II constitutional 
common law?see Keith E. Whittington, Political Foundations of Judicial Supremacy 
105-14 (2007) (discussing history of judicial review and related formation of theory 
surrounding the practice). 
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standings of the constitutional order without regard to the text of the 
Constitution, in the fashion of the common law. 
Conclusion 
Henry Monaghan has taught us to speak of constitutional common 
law, and has provided sophisticated analyses of two different types of con 
stitutional common law. He has unpacked one constitutional common 
law principle, which he has called the "protective power" of the presi 
dency. I have suggested that this principle is closely linked with another 
constitutional common law principle, the disposing power of the legisla 
ture. The disposing power has some far-reaching implications, including 
the implication that federal common law, and with it one of Monaghan's 
types of constitutional common law, may be suspect in many of its 
applications. 
As we retreat from the ideal of nondelegation, a crucial question 
arises: What exactly is the constitutional future of the First Branch of 
government in America? I have suggested one constitutional cornerstone 
of the function of the legislature in a post-nondelegation world. The dis 
posing power?arranging, ordering and distributing governmental au 
thority among the different institutions of society?is something that can 
be exercised effectively only by the legislature. The disposing power is 
not mentioned in the text of the Constitution. But it has slowly emerged 
as a principle of Type II constitutional common law. It is a principle of 
vital importance if the modern regulatory state is to hold together. We 
should recognize, honor, and nurture it as best we can. 
This content downloaded from 128.59.161.126 on Mon, 09 Nov 2015 16:07:43 UTC
All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions
